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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee

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PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

PerSSub-002-84

2 FGB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Chairman,	SECOM	
FROM:	Chairman,	PerSSub	25 X 1
SUBJECT:	Polygraph	Study	25X1 25X1
	tasking co	PerSSub-001-84, same Subject, in ontained in SECOM-D-172, dated ents the final report on the matter.	
VC1 the Departm	ents of Air organiz <u>ati</u>	study were received from CIA, FBI, Force, Army, Navy and State. The lons do not employ the polygraph in	25X1
you in a timely Intelligence Com congressional co were prepared fo in such a manner	fashion, remunity representation that neither that neither that neither that the continues of the continues	effort to provide this report to ealizing that it will be of use to resentatives testifying before the near future. The anecdotes tion in an unclassified forum, and her the subjects nor the contribute anticipate that the DCI will their present form.	25X1
Tiring a second of	ll most coo ion is i <u>n c</u>	nizations and their polygraph operative throughout this effort. order for the CIA and NSA members	25 X 1
		Chairman, PerSSub	25X1

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Attachment:

PerSSub memorandum 001-84 w/att.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

Serial: PerSSub-001-84

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Chairman, SECOM	2 te	B 1984
FROM:	Chairman, PerSSu	b	25X1
SUBJECT:	Polygraph Study		25 X 1
172, dated 11 Aug designed to estab	lust 1982, the Persolish the utility of Intelligence Com	SSub undertook a of the polygraph	as a security
designed to demon admissions which investigative mea validity of the p the quality of th	vey makes no pretostrate that the powould not otherwishs. The survey derocess, its science examiner's training out previously	olygraph is usefu se be forthcoming id not address th tific reliability ning may have on	ol in eliciting the by other the scientific the offect tresults. Its
from January 1980 earlier years. B timeframe, the su	vey was limited in to September 198 y essentially lim rvey therefore re- idence which support	 with a few cas iting coverage to presents but a sa 	ses drawn from this short ampling of a
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contain only the in an unclassifie Espionage to Secu Intelligence Comm from those Intell enforcement funct case, the use of	selected cases are salient facts and d forum. The issurity Violations. unity survey, how igence Community a ion as well were salmost-identical symity of the continuation to the continuation in the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation is salient to the continuation in the continuation is salient facts and description is salient facts and description is salient to the continuation is salient facts and description is salient to the continuation is sali	are intended to ues run the gamut Because this is ever, numerous cragencies having a specifically excluded	be presentable from an iminal cases law- uded. In each

CONFIDERTIAL

Serial: PerSSub-001-84 The sole conclusion drawn from this effort is that 25X1 there exists an ample body of evidence to prove that the polygraph brings out critical information otherwise denied. The exemplars are but a fraction of material available to support the utility of the polygraph. Our contention is not that the polygraph is perfect but that it is so successful as to justify its retention in our inventory of investigative tools. Its use, or threat of its use, was sufficient to deter Christopher John Boyce from seeking a position at a super-sensitive installation, and David Henry Barnett from attempting reinstatement with CIA. In Great Britain, the Russian spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, also conceded that the polygraph would have deterred him from joining GCHQ or would have exposed him while there. Again, how many others have been deterred by threat of polygraph is a matter for frightening speculation. The Perssub does not endorse the polygraph as a panace 25X1 for all security ills. The polygraph is not considered in isolation, and is always used in conjunction with other investigative tools. Recognizing its limitations and applying it judiciously, the polygraph is essential in obtaining otherwise unattainable information. The following 51 anecdotal summaries clearly support 25X1 the premise that the polygraph is a valuable and useful tool in the security programs of the Intelligence Community. 25X1 Chairman Personnel Security Subcommittee

Attachment:
As stated above (summaries)

SEC

25X1

SECURITY VIOLATIONS

Eight members of the U.S. military, all holding TOP SECRET clearances and Sensitive Compartmented Information access, were on duty in a secure communications facility on the day that two safes within the facility were left open at close of business. Normal investigative procedures failed to fix responsibility. Polygraph examinations were administered on the eight suspects and two individuals were identified as deceptive in their denials. Both subsequently admitted responsibility. The remaining six persons were exonerated as a result of their polygraph testing.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, listed on his security forms foreign travel to a communist-bloc country in conjunction with a previous employment. During a polygraph examination he admitted that while on such travel and in the company of foreign nationals, he was drugged, and an attempt was made to have him engage in a homosexual act. Later, he was directly requested to work for the intelligence service of that country and refused. Subject never reported this entrapment attempt or offer to any U.S. official. He continued to show deception on the polygraph examination.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen, became employed within the Intelligence Community in 1980 following security processing which was favorable except for minor illegal drug use. She was afforded a strong drug use briefing at that time. Subject received a routine reinvestigation polygraph in 1983 and admitted to using marijuana since beginning her employment; however, polygraph testing failed to support the truthfulness of her admissions. She also admitted to identifying classified sites to a foreign national whom she dated and discussing her impending foreign assignment with him.

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military who enjoyed access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was suspected of having contact with the embassy of a hostile country. Although many indicators of espionage were evident, a lengthy investigation complete with a complex surveillance failed to produce hard evidence of espionage. During a personal interview, Subject denied all allegations. Subject submitted to a polygraph and deception was noted concerning contact with a hostile intelligence service and passage of classified information. Subject subsequently admitted to contacting the hostile service, collecting a large quantity of highly classified information and passing it to that hostile service in exchange for money. The polygraph was also used to ascertain what information had been compromised.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance provided the requested biographical data during his security processing, all of which was favorable. Subject also indicated that he had not used any illegal drugs or narcotics. During the initial polygraph examination, Subject admitted only to limited drug use but showed deception in the area of serious crimes. He later admitted to theft of merchandise and pilferage from employers and to shoplifting the month prior to the polygraph examination. After further testing, Subject also admitted to expanded drug use.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, had a background investigation conducted in connection with an earlier assignment. Personal biographic data was favorable. During the applicant screening polygraph examination Subject admitted that while serving with U.S. forces overseas he lived for over a year with a woman known to him as an agent of a foreign intelligence service. She paid all of his offpost living expenses, was well-educated, traveled often, and had unlimited financial resources. Prior to sharing an apartment with her, Subject observed a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for clandestine use in her apartment. He did not report this to appropriate military intelligence authorities (a court martial offense since she paid for the apartment which they shared.

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military, was one of five individuals employed in a Communications Center from which highly classified communiques of sensitive DoD, State and White House matters were being illegally provided to a foreign intelligence service. All suspects held TOP SECRET clearance and Sensitive Compartmented Information access. Normal investigative procedures failed to identify which of the suspects was guilty. When polygraph testing of the Subject indicated deception, he admitted to working for a foreign intelligence service and to supplying a great quantity of information to that service. Polygraph testing of the remaining suspects did not reveal any deception.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen with extensive employment with a member of the Intelligence Community, was polygraphed in conjunction with his periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph examination, subject admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to news media personalities over a period of ten years.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for employment with a member of the Intelligence Community, received a background investigation with favorable results. During a subsequent polygraph, Subject admitted that he had purchased and sold illegal drugs and had been involved in other criminal activities including theft, insurance fraud, arson, and receipt of stolen goods.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, had a favorable background investigation conducted on him. During a subsequent polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive to questions regarding contact with a foreign intelligence service and the truthfulness of his application for employment. Subject subsequently admitted that attempts had been made by a foreign intelligence service to recruit him prior to leaving his country of origin and again while en route to the United States. He also admitted to falsification of his employment application by omitting additional membership in various organizations.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was given a polygraph examination. Subject described his various radical and Marxist connections including residence with a British Communist Party member while both were students at a British university. Subject visited the Soviet Union twice on British student tours. During his initial tour he became particularly friendly with a young woman who described herself as a student and a part-time INTOURIST guide. was also his tour guide on the second trip. Subject later corresponded with her and informed her that he had applied for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies. Shortly thereafter, she came to the U.S. supposedly to visit relatives. She contacted Subject and arranged to meet him the day after his polygraph examination. After admitting to this forthcoming meeting, Subject continued to show deception to counterintelligence questions during the polygraph. While Subject denied that he had ever been approached to engage in espionage, deception was indicated to questions regarding additional knowledge of individuals involved in espionage against the United States.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor, with access to classified information, required security processing for access to another classified project. During a polygraph examination, Subject admitted that he furnished classified information and industrial proprietary information to foreign nationals of hostile countries.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community and a former member of the U.S. military provided suspicious intelligence information about planned terrorist activity at two U.S. military installations, to include the theft of military weapons. Subject was administered a polygraph examination and was found deceptive. Upon further questioning, he admitted that he deliberately fabricated the story of planned terrorist activity and then reported it in order to gain recognition. Subject also admitted to unrelated contact with hostile intelligence services to discuss military and cultural matters as well as possible defection.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, had a favorable national agency check conducted on him in conjunction with a previous employment where he held a SECRET clearance. During his polygraph examination, Subject showed deception to questions about involvement in intelligence for a foreign government, espionage activity, intent to commit espionage against the United States, the accuracy of personal biographic data Subject provided and other related questions. Subject admitted that he falsely reported an academic affiliation during two lengthy tours abroad, amounting to a total of eight years. He admitted that during those years he actually served as a scientific advisor to the chief of a foreign military intelligence service. He reported directly to the head of military intelligence of the foreign power. Although Subject admitted that he might, in the future, pass classified information to that foreign military intelligence service, he claimed that he had never done so. He had never revealed his foreign intelligence connection to his employer or to the cognizant government security Subject was still in contact with the foreign intelligence service though legitimately so through his U.S. contractor employment. Subject continued to show deception to questions about giving or selling classified information to the foreign intelligence service.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military service, was detailed to an agency within the Intelligence Community. In conjunction with his assignment, Subject was polygraphed. He admitted to a wide variety of homosexual activities with foreign nationals, one of whom was blackmailing him.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, previously worked for the U.S. Government and held a TOP SECRET clearance. A favorable background investigation was completed in conjunction with his prior government position. As part of his processing for a TOP SECRET clearance as a contractor, Subject was administered a polygraph examination and showed deception to questions pertaining to divulgence of classified Subject then admitted to divulging classified information to friends, co-workers, and family members. He held a classified slide show for friends and family and also provided classified information to a foreign national. Deception was indicated to questions concerning Subject's intent to commit espionage and/or sabotage against the United States and Subject threatened to divulge classified information if he lost his clearance. During his final examination, Subject continued to show deception regarding his intention to commit espionage against the United States.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen and an applicant for a sensitive position within the Intelligence Community, provided the necessary biographical data and was favorably investigated. There was no indication in his declarations or during the background investigation of any contact with a foreign intelligence service. During polygraph testing Subject admitted that a family member had in fact been a member of such a service. Testing did not support his statement that this was his only intelligence affiliation. During subsequent interrogation and testing, Subject made increasingly more damaging admissions which made it evident that he had worked for known members of a foreign intelligence service in the recent past.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community with access to classified information, was administered a polygraph examination in conjunction with his reinvestigation. During the polygraph, Subject admitted that he had shoplifted and changed price tags on merchandise. He further admitted to accepting gratuities from contractors and to providing classified information to uncleared contractors to assist them in their bidding.

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military who was known to have had contact with a foreign intelligence service, was arrested while selling classified material to undercover Federal Agents. During interrogation, Subject denied additional contact with hostile intelligence services and admitted no additional security infractions. During a polygraph examination Subject was found deceptive in those areas and subsequently admitted additional liaison with a hostile intelligence service and possession of additional classified documents at his residence.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a sensitive Intelligence Community position, was the subject of a full background investigation which raised questions regarding his associates and overseas travel. When these issues were raised during a pre-polygraph interview, Subject maintained that he had no contact with foreign intelligence representatives. When polygraph testing on this issue showed deception, Subject admitted associating with persons he believed to represent a foreign intelligence service and having visited a foreign embassy on occasions, the most recent being a week prior to his polygraph. Although he declared he had nothing more to admit, further testing failed to support this. He later made additional admissions in regard to contact with foreign embassies during his overseas travel.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community, had previously held clearances with access to classified information. During polygraph testing he admitted to the unauthorized disclosure of highly classified information on many occasions to associates and family members.

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, was serving in the U.S. military and had access to cryptologic information. During the applicant screening polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception. In the post-test interview, he admitted to various petty-crimes and miscellaneous wrongdoing. The polygraph examiner noted continued specific reactions to relevant questions and when the Subject was reexamined several weeks later, the same situation continued. His access was withdrawn and an investigation opened. While that investigation was still in progress, Subject was found dead in his automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed with a security clearance within the Intelligence Community, received a polygraph in conjunction with his periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph, Subject admitted to falsification of operational reporting, fraudulent accounting practices, improper handling of classified material and serious drug abuse.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was subjected to a full background investigation after applying for a sensitive Intelligence Community position. Nothing unfavorable was discovered. There were no indications in his personal declarations of association with a foreign intelligence service. Initial polygraph testing indicated that Subject failed to list a previous employment at a foreign embassy in his country of origin, and that he was related by marriage to a member of a foreign national police force. During subsequent testing, Subject was also found to be deceptive in the area of currently working for a foreign intelligence service and also to being instructed by a foreign intelligence service to seek U.S. Government employment.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and having a security clearance, was suspected of discussing highly classified information concerning a special project with unauthorized persons. During a personal interview he denied any involvement in an unauthorized disclosure. During a subsequent polygraph examination, deception was indicated and he later admitted that he did discuss in detail the highly classified project with unauthorized persons.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, was polygraphed following a favorable background investigation. Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning contact with foreign intelligence services. During subsequent interrogation he admitted that he had been contacted by representatives of a foreign intelligence service prior to leaving his native country. A system was devised whereby he would receive instructions from the foreign intelligence service after he arrived in the United States. Furthermore he signed an agreement that he would never reveal this contact. Subject had numerous contacts with the hostile foreign intelligence service in the months prior to entering the United States and was indeed contacted in the pre-arranged manner after his arrival.

EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL

25X1

Subject, an applicant for employment with a member of the Intelligence Community, received a favorable background investigation and was subsequently cleared for limited access to classified information. During a polygraph examination he admitted to stealing from his previous employers over a ten year period. Testing further disclosed that alcohol consumption affected his personal and professional life style and that he was unable to work on five occasions and blacked out weekly due to excessive drinking. He further acknowledged discussing with friends and relatives classified information pertaining to sensitive sites and missions.

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was alleged by a superior officer to have passed classified information to a member of a hostile intelligence service. During a personal interview Subject admitted only to passing one piece of classified data to a representative of that country. When polygraph results indicated deception, Subject subsequently admitted giving a substantial number of classified items to that representative who was later proven to be a member of his country's intelligence service.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a non U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, had a favorable background investigation conducted on him. During a pre-polygraph interview Subject indicated that he had never been in contact with a representative of a foreign intelligence service. He was subsequently polygraphed and was found deceptive to questions regarding contact with a foreign intelligence service. After further questioning, Subject admitted that while he was employed as a contractor for an intelligence service of a friendly country he had several contacts with members of a hostile intelligence service. Subject never reported this information to his employer or to U.S. authorities.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen employed as a courier for a foreign intelligence service, was arrested as he was meeting a foreign intelligence agent, who was actually a U.S.-controlled agent working undercover. Subject was subsequently tried and convicted of espionage. Throughout interrogation he maintained he could not identify any other intelligence operatives engaging in espionage in and against the United States. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted to knowing and, in fact, identified several persons in the United States known or suspected by him of being in the employ of the same intelligence service Subject served.

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance had a favorable background investigation in conjunction with an earlier assignment. All personal biographical data was favorable. polygraph examination Subject indicated deception to questions about knowing others engaging in espionage, intent on his part to engage in espionage, and the truthfulness of the information on his security forms. During the post-test interview he admitted that he had been terminated from his employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a year of training but before he was assigned to a position. He admitted that he engaged in freelance journalist work in the U.S. and abroad with an Asian. During their work, the Asian told him he was an intelligence agent for his country. Although the Subject identified the agent by name, his location in the U.S., and his intelligence service, he would not give many details of their joint activities. Subject continued to show deception to questions about intending to commit espionage against the United States.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community, was subjected to a full background investigation during which nothing unfavorable was discovered. During his polygraph examination, he declared that he had no contact with officials of foreign intelligence services and he denied that he had been directed by any such service to seek Intelligence Community employment. Testing showed deception on these issues and Subject subsequently admitted that prior to leaving his country of origin, officials of that country's intelligence service contacted him in a recruitment attempt. He maintained that he had refused to cooperate with them.

LOSS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to classified information was one of three military personnel with direct access to approximately one thousand classified aperture cards, which were subsequently reported missing. An investigation was initiated and all three individuals denied culpability. Each was then administered a polygraph examination, with no deception indicated by the other two individuals. During Subject's polygraph, however, deception was indicated. When questioned further, he admitted that he had deliberately destroyed the aperture cards due to inventory/filing problems. Additional polygraph testing did not surface any indication of compromise of the missing cards.

	ESPIONAGE	25 X 1
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	ESPIONAGE	25 X 1

Subject, a U.S. citizen who divided his employment career between two agencies within the Intelligence Community, required security processing for detail to yet another intelligence organization. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to Soviet intelligence and involvement in a homosexual act in the USSR.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the U.S. Intelligence Community with access to classified information, was administered a polygraph in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted to operational security indiscretions and sexual misconduct with an overseas asset. Additionally, he continued to show deception to counterintelligence-type questions.

25X1

Subject, a foreign national employed in a non-sensitive position with a U.S. Intelligence Community agency, was assigned within a friendly foreign country. His father was also employed in a non-sensitive position with a U.S. Intelligence agency in his homeland, a hostile foreign country. During normal debriefing interviews, Subject admitted to several contacts with representatives of a hostile intelligence service but denied cooperation with them. He appeared forgetful and evasive on this issue. The polygraph showed deception regarding the contact issue, and when confronted, Subject not only admitted to greater contact but also to cooperation with a hostile intelligence service. He attributed his cooperation to his family's hostage situation. As a result of his admissions, Subject was terminated from his position. He was immediately arrested, tried and convicted of espionage by the friendly host country.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community was arrested for petty theft. During a subsequent specific issues polygraph examination administered by his Intelligence Community employer, Subject admitted to extensive shoplifting. He further admitted to skimming \$7500 from operational funds.

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen with 20 years experience within the Intelligence Community, was administered a polygraph examination in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to non-U.S. citizens, including a foreign liaison official.

25X1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, indicated that he truthfully reported his organizational affiliations on his application for employment. Subject advised that none of his relatives was employed by or cooperating with any foreign intelligence services. Subject was subsequently polygraphed and found deceptive to questions regarding his membership in organizations as well as knowledge of representatives of foreign intelligence services. When questioned further about his relatives and their cooperation with foreign intelligence services, Subject refused to cooperate and terminated the interview.

DRUG USE

25X1

Subject, a member of the U.S. military service applied for a civilian position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance. A prior background investigation was conducted in conjunction with his military service. Prior to his polygraph examination, Subject indicated minor use of marijuana and hashish. He reported identical information to a staff psychologist during his employment processing. During the polygraph examination, he admitted to heavy use of marijuana, in addition to repeated use of hashish, "speed", and quaaludes while in the military service between 1978 and 1982. Generally he purchased these drugs for his personal use; on several occasions he sold small amounts to finance his own drug use. He admitted that he falsified his application forms and lied to the staff psychologist to enhance his prospects for employment. He ceased all illegal drug use several months prior to the date of his polygraph examination.

2

ESPIONAGE

25X1

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was administered a polygraph examination. When deception was indicated to questions concerning espionage, Subject admitted that her former husband was engaging in espionage against the U.S. for a foreign intelligence service. These activities spanned several years while her former spouse held various positions with the U.S. government and with defense contractors requiring classified access. Subject provided very specific details on his espionage activities. She denied any personal involvement in espionage, with the exception of knowledge of her former spouse's activities.

25**X**1

Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was an applicant for a sensitive position within the Intelligence Community. A complete background investigation failed to disclose any unfavorable information. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject admitted to providing non-intelligence information to a foreign intelligence service. The polygraph indicated deception in that area and during subsequent interrogation Subject confessed to gathering intelligence information for a foreign intelligence service.

25X1

ESPIONAGE

Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance. A favorable background investigation was previously conducted on Subject in conjunction with his military service and all personal biographical data provided by him was favorable. During the polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning espionage against the United States. He then described several visits to a hostile embassy to make arrangements to defect. Embassy officials obtained extensive biographical information on Subject, retained copies of his documents, and upon learning of his pending applications for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to remain in the U.S.

25X1

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community, received a background investigation and polygraph in connection with her initial assignment in 1974. She was cautioned in 1976 to heed regulations and not take classified information home and again in 1977, when it was determined that she discussed SECRET and Internal Use Only documents with her husband, a foreign born naturalized U.S. citizen. Reinvestigation polygraph examinations revealed additional significant unauthorized disclosures and the fact that between 1976 and 1980, her spouse acted as an attorney for the Soviet Embassy, where his principal contact was a KGB officer. Subject continued to show deception to questions regarding unauthorized disclosures.

25**X**1

ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was a former member of the U.S. military where he had access to classified information. A favorable background investigation was previously completed on Subject in conjunction with his prior military service. Subject was administered an applicant screening polygraph examination and showed deception to the question relating to intent to commit espionage or sabotage against the United States; however, he made no admissions. During a reexamination deception was also noted to questions about clandestine contacts with representatives of a foreign country. Subject then admitted that he would sell classified information to a foreign power if it would guarantee him a comfortable living. He continually denied ever having committed espionage, having clandestine contacts, or actually having a specific intent or plan to commit espionage. However, deception was still indicated to questions regarding intent to commit espionage against the United States and to having had clandestine contacts with agents of foreign powers.

25X1

DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subject, a U.S. citizen on active military duty and assigned to an organization within the Intelligence Community, was administered a polygraph in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. During a series of polygraph examinations over a two week period, Subject admitted that he had provided classified information to a foreign security service without authorization. He had taken classified information to his personal residence on several occasions, and had taken uncleared friends to his place of employment to explain the classified mission and functions of the installation. Polygraph testing also revealed that Subject had been stealing office supplies since 1972, some of which he had sold. He also admitted taking money from office funds and from the desk of co-workers.

25X1

ESPIONAGE

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was administered a polygraph examination. When deception was indicated to counterintelligence questions, she admitted that while overseas she was cultivated by the host country intelligence service. Subject was offered a position in which she was to travel to another country under a false identity, but as a U.S. citizen, and then obtain employment in the target country (not the U.S.) to gather information. She was to be provided training in intelligence activities. Subject said that after two days of thoughtful deliberation, she declined the host country's offer. She had not previously reported this to the U.S. authorities.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT

Subject, a W.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was employed as an engineer by another government agency. During his polygraph examination, he admitted that his engineering degree, which was listed as part of his personal biographical data, was phony and was purchased by him through mail order in London for \$100. Subject also admitted that he shot and wounded his second wife and served two years in prison

for this offense. (He omitted his prison term from his personal biographical data.) His present wife was missing under unusual circumstances which he refused to explain. Subject continued to show deception to questions regarding additional involvement in criminal activity.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the Intelligence Community, received a favorable background investigation. Polygraph testing surfaced the issue of divided loyalty. Subject claimed to be loyal both to the United States and another country and stated that if approached by the other country he would relocate there to offer his assistance, after resigning his U.S. position. Subject admitted that he would provide information obtained through his U.S. employment to the other country based on his own determination that such information would not be detrimental to U.S. interests. Polygraph testing further resulted in Subject's admission to recent use of illegal drugs and two acts of shoplifting.

Subject, a former Intelligence officer, was convicted of espionage activities on behalf of the KGB in 1980. When instructed by his KGB handlers to regain his former Intelligence Community employment, he stated that he was constrained from doing so because of his fear of

taking a polygraph examination.

ESPIONAGE

25X1

25X1